Plasticity in Unimodal and Multimodal Brain Areas Reflects Multisensory Changes in Self-Face Identification by Apps, Matthew A. J. et al.
Plasticity in Unimodal and Multimodal Brain Areas Reﬂects Multisensory Changes
in Self-Face Identiﬁcation
Matthew A. J. Apps1,2, Ana Tajadura-Jiménez3, Marty Sereno4, Olaf Blanke5 and Manos Tsakiris2
1Nufﬁeld Department of Clinical Neuroscience, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 9DU, UK, 2Lab of
Action and Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX, UK, 3UCL Interaction
Center (UCLIC), University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK, 4Department of Psychological Science, Birkbeck, University
of London, WC1H 0DS, UK and 5Center for Neuroprosthetics and Brain-Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne,
SV 2805, Switzerland
M.A.J. Apps and A. Tajadura-Jiménez declare equal contribution.
Address correspondence to Matthew A. J. Apps. Email: matthew.apps@ndcn.ox.ac.uk
Nothing provides as strong a sense of self as seeing one’s face.
Nevertheless, it remains unknown how the brain processes the
sense of self during the multisensory experience of looking at one’s
face in a mirror. Synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation on one’s own
and another’s face, an experience that is akin to looking in the
mirror but seeing another’s face, causes the illusory experience of
ownership over the other person’s face and changes in self-recog-
nition. Here, we investigate the neural correlates of this enfacement
illusion using fMRI. We examine activity in the human brain as par-
ticipants experience tactile stimulation delivered to their face, while
observing either temporally synchronous or asynchronous tactile
stimulation delivered to another’s face on either a specularly congru-
ent or incongruent location. Activity in the multisensory right
temporo-parietal junction, intraparietal sulcus, and the unimodal
inferior occipital gyrus showed an interaction between the synchro-
nicity and the congruency of the stimulation and varied with the self-
reported strength of the illusory experience, which was recorded
after each stimulation block. Our results highlight the important inter-
play between unimodal and multimodal information processing for
self-face recognition, and elucidate the neurobiological basis for the
plasticity required for identifying with our continuously changing
visual appearance.
Keywords: enfacement, face recognition, fMRI, multisensory, self-
recognition
Introduction
The ability to represent the visual properties of one’s face as
distinct from others is a fundamental aspect of human self-
awareness. Recognizing one’s face in a mirror is a key behav-
ioral marker of self-awareness (Gallup 1970), an ability ex-
pressed by a small selection of species, including humans
(Gallup 1970; Anderson and Gallup Jr. 2011). Neuroimaging
studies of self-face recognition suggest that representations of
one’s own facial appearance may be stored in a specialized
network of areas, which is engaged when viewing images of
one’s own face (Kircher et al. 2001; Uddin et al. 2005, 2006,
2008; Platek et al. 2006, 2008; Devue et al. 2007; Kaplan et al.
2008; Sugiura et al. 2008; Platek and Kemp 2009; Devue and
Bredart 2011; Ramasubbu et al. 2011; Apps et al. 2012; Ma and
Han 2012). Of these areas, the inferior occipital gyrus (IOG),
the inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), and the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) respond only to images of one’s current, but not
one’s past face, suggesting they continuously update a visual
representation of one’s facial appearance (Apps et al. 2012).
These studies have used static face stimuli to investigate self-
recognition. However, the way in which infants and nonhu-
man primates succeed in recognizing their specular image
suggests that processes other than mere visual perception are
engaged in self-identiﬁcation. The normal experience of
looking into one’s face in the mirror is accompanied by a con-
tinuous integration of tactile and proprioceptive events per-
ceived on one’s face and visual events perceived on the
mirror-reﬂection. Such processes putatively underlie responses
on the classic “rouge” task of mirror self-recognition. In this
task, the placement of a red spot on the face of infants and
some primates while they are looking into a mirror, results in
behaviors that indicate a detection of the spot on that location
of the body, which are evaluated by a goal-directed movement
towards the red spot (Gallup 1970; Bertenthal and Fischer
1978; Suarez and Gallup 1981; Suddendorf et al. 2007; Ander-
son and Gallup Jr. 2011). Such updating of the representation
of one’s visual appearance during multisensory stimulation
may also underlie the assimilation of changes, and provide a
sense of continuity of one’s self over time (Tsakiris 2010; Apps
et al. 2012). Therefore, the static stimuli used in the vast
majority of self-face recognition studies seem to violate the
dynamic, multisensory conditions present when looking in a
mirror and thus lack sensitivity for identifying activity related
to mirror self-recognition during multisensory stimulation.
While research investigating self-face recognition has used
static stimuli, studies of body-ownership and bodily illusions
have used multisensory stimulation to investigate where and
how visuo-tactile stimulation is integrated in the brain. Neuroi-
maging studies highlight that the premotor cortex (PMC), intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS), cerebellum, and TPJ are activated when
visuo-tactile stimulation causes an illusory sense of ownership
over the whole, or parts, of a body (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Ionta
et al. 2011; Petkova et al. 2011). More recently it has been
suggested that representations of one’s self change through
the integration of visual and tactile information when looking
in a mirror (Tajadura-Jiménez et al. 2012b). The matching
between felt and observed sensorimotor signals purportedly
leads to the formation, and the updating, of a mental represen-
tation of one’s visual appearance. Seeing an unfamiliar face
being touched at the same time as one’s own face, a situation
akin to looking in a mirror but seeing another person’s face,
changes one’s ability to self-recognize and creates the illusory
experience of looking at one’s self in the mirror (Tsakiris 2008;
Sforza et al. 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al. 2012a). This “enface-
ment” illusion arises due to the congruency between felt and
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seen sensory events and does not arise from asynchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation. However, little is understood about
the neuronal processes that underpin this type of visuo-tactile
integration and create a sense that I am looking at “me.”
Plasticity in self-recognition may therefore occur through the
integration of visuo-tactile information in multimodal areas
which leads to a sense of ownership over one’s face. Under-
standing the neurobiological mechanisms that underpin the
multisensory experience of looking at one’s face in a mirror
may therefore be crucial for understanding the plasticity of
self-recognition. However, no previous study has investigated
activity in the brain during the multisensory driven process of
experiencing a face as “me.”
Does the multisensory experience of mirror-self recognition
engage areas previously known for their role in integrating
multisensory information and creating a sense of ownership
over the body, or alternatively, does it recruit a distinct network
which is activated when recognizing static images of the self-
face? Here, we used block-design fMRI to examine brain activity
during the enfacement illusion, as a corollary of mirror self-
recognition. Participants observed movies of an unfamiliar face
receiving tactile stimulation to the face while receiving tactile
stimulation themselves from an air puff system. The visuo-tactile
stimulation could be synchronized or not and on either a specu-
larly congruent or incongruent location on the faces. After each
block, participants rated the extent to which they experienced
the illusion on a 7-point Likert scale. This design enabled us to
examine where in the brain activity varies with the extent to
which participants experience the face that they see being
touched in synchrony with their own face as “self.” We predict
that activity in brain areas that have previously been implicated
in self-face recognition and multisensory bodily illusions will
ﬂuctuate with the experience of enfacement.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen female right-handed paid-volunteers (mean age = 25.8 years,
SD = 3.88) gave their informed consent to participate. Only partici-
pants who experienced the enfacement illusion in a preliminary behav-
ioral session were invited to take part in this experiment, as explained
below. The study was approved by the Royal Holloway, Psychology
Departmental Ethics Committees, and conformed to regulations set out
in the Birkbeck-UCL Neuroimaging Centre (BUCNI) MRI Rules of
Operation (http://bucni.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/index.shtml).
Apparatus andMaterials
Two different female “models” (∼20 years old), who were unfamiliar to
the participants, were recorded being touched with a tap of a cotton
bud on the right cheek or on the right hand side of the chin, at a
random frequency ranging from 0.33 to 0.76 Hz, while they main-
tained a neutral facial expression. This allowed 4 40 s “induction”
movies to be produced, which differed in the unfamiliar face displayed
and the part of the face being touched. In a pilot experiment, the 2
models were rated on scales of trustworthiness and physical attractive-
ness, along with 8 other faces, by 11 participants, who did not take
part in the subsequent parts of the study. Previous research has found
a bidirectional link between the physical attractiveness that participants
attribute to another person’s face and the strength of the enfacement illu-
sion felt for that face (Paladino et al. 2010; Sforza et al. 2010). In
addition, trustworthy faces are more likely to be identiﬁed as looking
like the self (Verosky and Todorov 2010). We therefore ensured that the
faces were equally evaluated in terms of trustworthiness and physical at-
tractiveness, to avoid potential inﬂuences of the seen face in the pattern
of the enfacement illusion. The 2 faces were not signiﬁcantly different
on either measure (trustworthiness: t10 = 0.65, P > 0.53; physical attrac-
tiveness: t10 = 1.26, P > 0.23). In addition, the models viewed in the
synchronous and asynchronous conditions were counterbalanced
across participants. Tactile stimulation was delivered to the left cheek
of participants through puffs of air. To deliver the stimulation we used
the arrangement of Huang and Sereno (2007). The system consisted of
an air compressor in the scanner control room, which provided input
to a solenoid valve (Numatics) that was controlled by TTL pulses from
a data acquisition and control card (National Instruments USB-6800).
Plastic air tubes from the valve were connected to a block ﬁxed in the
magnet behind the head coil. From this base, a tube with a ﬂexible
nozzle (Loc-Line) that could be freely positioned was used to direct air
puffs to the participant’s cheek. The input air pressure (30–40 psi) was
adjusted so that a 100-ms air puff was delivered, which felt akin to the
level of tactile sensation experienced by a touch delivered from the
cotton bud, with a similar duration. The system delivers pure unconta-
minated air with a temperature comfortable for the participant. In this
study, we used air puffs to deliver tactile stimulation to participants
while inside the MRI scanner. To ensure that participants experienced
the illusory experience when using different methods of stimulation to
the participant and the model in the video, we performed a pilot study
on participants who previously had reported experiencing the illusion.
The pilot study highlighted that we could evoke the enfacement illu-
sion using this paradigm. Thus, as in a previous study (Mazzurega
et al. 2011), we show that the enfacement illusion can be induced even
when the stimulation applied to the 2 faces is not identical. The tactile
stimulation the participants received was therefore akin to the touch
being delivered on the faces in the movies described above.
Visual stimuli were projected onto a screen which participants
viewed via a mirror positioned above their face. Participants made
responses (see below) using their right hand on a 4-button MRI-
compatible response box. Brain images were acquired with a Siemens
1.5 Tesla Avanto MRI scanner at Birkbeck-University College London
Centre for Neuroimaging (BUCNI). Presentation software (Neurobeha-
vioral Systems, Inc., USA) was used to deliver stimuli and record
responses. NI Measurement and Automation Explorer (Version 5.0.0f1)
provided access to the data acquisition and control card (National Instru-
ments USB-6800). Behavioral and fMRI Data were analyzed in Matlab
2006a, SPSS 19, SPM8, andMRICRON.
Procedure
Pre-MRI Screening Session
Thirty-six female right-handed paid-volunteers were tested on the en-
facement illusion paradigm in a separate behavioral session, which
took place a few weeks before the MRI session. Participants were
exposed to 2 repetitions of 3 different visuo-tactile stimulation con-
ditions, each lasting for 40 s and with their order randomized: synchro-
nous congruent, synchronous incongruent, and asynchronous
congruent, which are described in the subsequent section. The subjec-
tive experience of participants during each visuo-tactile stimulation
condition was assessed with a statement (I felt I was looking at my
face), for which participants rated their level of agreement using a
7-item Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (+3) to “strongly dis-
agree” (−3). This statement was adopted from previous studies on the
enfacement illusion (Tajadura-Jimenez et al. 2012a). A keypad was used
for this purpose. The 15 participants who experienced the illusion most
strongly (i.e., they agreed more strongly with the statement) in the syn-
chronous congruent condition in comparison to the other 2 conditions;
mean synchronous congruent = 1.73, SD = 1.13; mean synchronous
incongruent =−0.68, SD = 1.57; mean asynchronous congruent =−1.89,
SD = 1.16) were invited back to participate in the MRI session.
At the end of this pre-MRI screening session, participants were pre-
sented with 2 additional synchronous congruent conditions and were
required to indicate the onset of the enfacement illusion by pressing a
key in the keypad. The IMS lasted for 40 s, independently of the partici-
pant key press. The average onset of the illusion across participants
was 13.31 ± 8.56 s (M ± SD). This task revealed both within and across
participant variability in the onset of the illusion. The responses across
participants were highly variable (M = 13.3 s, SD = ±8.56, range = 5.56–
32.65 s). The responses within participants were in comparison
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relatively consistent, although there was still variability, with the
average difference in the keypresses from trial 1 to trial 2 being 5.32 s
(SD = ±3.40, range = 0.20–10.28 s).
Scanning Session
Fifteen participants lay supine in an MRI scanner with the ﬁngers of
the right hand positioned on the response box. The nozzle connected
to the solenoid valve was placed over the left cheek of the participant’s
face, through which the air puffs were delivered at a frequency ranging
from 0.33 to 0.76 Hz during 40 s periods while they watched the
movies of tactile stimulation being delivered to the other’s face.
Experimental Design
We used a 2 × 2 factorial block design. The ﬁrst factor was the specular
congruency of the visuo-tactile stimulation. While receiving tactile
stimulation on the left check, participants viewed tactile stimulation
being delivered to the other’s face to either a specularly congruent
location (i.e., the right cheek of the other person) as if the participant
was looking at a mirror, or at an incongruent location (i.e., the chin).
This incognruent condition controlled for the possibility that simply
the synchrony of a seen touch on another’s face and a felt touch on
one’s own face, even when the seen touch and the felt touch are on
different locations of the face, could drive activity in multisensory
areas. In the congruent conditions, the touch stimulated the same
portion of the cheek of the face in the movie and of the participant’s
face. The second factor was the temporal synchronicity of the visuo-
tactile stimulation. This could either be synchronous, where touch on
the participant’s face and the face in the movie was temporally synchro-
nized, or asynchronous, with a lag of 1 s separating the stimulation
on the participants face and that on the other’s face in the movie
(see Fig. 1a). This created a design with 4 conditions, synchronous
Figure 1. Experimental design, timeline, and behavioral results. (a) While in the scanner and in 40 s blocks, participants received tactile stimulation to their left cheek from puffs of
air. The stimulation was akin to the cotton bud that was seen touching the face of another unfamiliar person in a movie which was played to the participant at the same time. The
tactile stimulation on the 2 faces could be either synchronous or asynchronous and on either specularly congruent or incongruent locations. For the incongruent stimulation,
participants observed the other person being touched on the chin. After each block of stimulation, participants rated the strength of the illusory experience on a 7-point Likert scale,
ranging from “strongly agree” (+3) to “strongly disagree” (−3). (b) The block interval was 50 s, during which there was, a movie (40 s), followed by a blank screen presented for a
variable interstimulus interval (0–4 s), followed by the question and Likert scale (maximum 6 s), followed by a blank screen presented for the remaining time to complete 50 s. (c)
The mean Likert scale responses across participants for the 4 conditions are shown. As it can be seen, participants showed a stronger illusory experience in the synchronous,
congruent condition, as predicted. Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
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congruent (Sync-Cong), synchronous incongruent (Sync-Incong), asyn-
chronous congruent (Async-Cong), and asynchronous incongruent
(Async-Incong). The incongruent and the asynchronous conditions
served as control conditions in which no enfacement illusion was ex-
pected (Tsakiris 2008; Sforza et al. 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al. 2012a).
As in the behavioral session, after each block, participants were
asked to report their level of agreement with the statement “I felt I was
looking at my face,” using a 7-item Likert scale displayed on the
screen. The participants used the response box for this task. A
maximum of 6 s was allowed to answer the statement, which was sufﬁ-
cient for all participants. The onset of the question was jittered ran-
domly and uniformly over the 4 s period after the offset of the movies.
Thus, the block interval was 50 s, during which there was, a movie (40
s), followed by a blank screen presented for a variable duration (0–4 s),
followed by the question and Likert scale (maximum 6 s), and followed
by a blank screen presented for the remaining time to complete 50 s
(see Fig. 1b). Participants used one button to move up the scale, one to
move down, and a third to indicate that they had chosen their
response. This question also afforded us the opportunity to analyze the
data parametrically, with the responses to this question being used a
predictor of activity during the corresponding movie. This was ben-
eﬁcial as it allowed us to examine the extent to which participants were
experiencing the illusion in each block, rather than following the ap-
proach used in previous designs (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Ionta et al. 2011;
Petkova et al. 2011), where “off-line” reports of the strength of the
experience after the experiment are regressed against the BOLD
response in different conditions. Thus, our design afforded us the op-
portunity to examine activity that related to the experience of the illu-
sion on-line. To analyze the behavioral responses, we performed
pairwise comparisons between conditions and corrected for multiple
comparisons using a Bonferroni correction (P < 0.05).
There were 3 experimental runs, each lasting ∼10 min. In each run,
the 4 conditions were repeated 3 times each, their order randomized,
resulting in 12 trials completed in each run and a total of 36 trials.
Image Acquisition
For each participant, T2* weighted echo planar images (EPI) were ac-
quired. Thirty-ﬁve slices were acquired in an interleaved manner, at an
oblique angle to the AC-PC line. A voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm was used;
TR = 3 s, TE = 50 ms, ﬂip angle = 90°. Prior to the functional scans,
high-resolution T1-weighted structural images were acquired at a resol-
ution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm using an MPRAGE sequence.
Image Analysis
All preprocessing and statistical analyses were conducted using SPM8
(www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The EPI images were ﬁrst realigned and
co-registered to the subject’s own anatomical image. The structural
image was processed using a uniﬁed segmentation procedure combin-
ing segmentation, bias correction, and spatial normalization to the
MNI template (Ashburner and Friston 2005); the same normalization
parameters were then used to normalize the EPI images. Lastly, a Gaus-
sian kernel of 8 mm FWHMwas applied to spatially smooth the images
in order to conform to the assumptions of the GLM implemented in
SPM8 (see below).
Statistical Analysis
Event Deﬁnition and Modeling
The data were analyzed using 2 different approaches. First, we ana-
lyzed the data within the factorial design outlined above, with 2 factors
Synchronicity (synchronous or asynchronous) and specular Con-
gruency (congruent or incongruent). For each subject, we created a
GLM in which there were 5 regressors for each of the 3 scanning ses-
sions. Four events in each session corresponded to each of the 4 con-
ditions (Sync-Cong, Sync-Incong, Async-Cong, Asyn-Incong). These
were modeled as 40 s events, which were convolved with the canonical
hemodynamic response function (HRF). The ﬁfth event in each session
corresponded to the question periods after every block, which were
modeled as 6 s blocks and convolved with the canonical HRF.
The second analysis we performed was a parametric analysis, which
looked for activity that was scaled with the subjective experience of the
illusion, regardless of the condition in the factorial design. For this
analysis, the regressors used were similar to those outlined for the fac-
torial analysis. However, the regressors for the 4 experimental con-
ditions in each session were collapsed into one regressor which
corresponded to all conditions in that session. A ﬁrst-order parametric
modulator of that regressor was then created, using the responses on the
question at the end of each block of IMS, to scale the canonical HRF. As
such, this parametric modulator acted as a predictor of the level of
activity based on the extent to which the participants self-reported the
experience of the illusion “on-line.” That is, we used the responses to the
question “I felt like I was looking at my face,” which were collected after
the offset of stimulation in every block, regardless of the condition in the
factorial design to which the block belonged. This approach allowed us
to look block by block at the strength of the illusory experience, and not
the presumed strength based on “off-line” questions before or after the
scanning session, as in previous studies (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Ionta et al.
2011; Petkova et al. 2011). In both the factorial and parametric analyses,
the residual effects of head motion were modeled in the analysis by in-
cluding the 6 parameters of head motion acquired from the realignment
stage of the preprocessing as covariates of no interest. Prior to the study,
a set of planned experimental timings were carefully checked so that
they resulted in an estimable GLM in which the statistical independence
of the different event types was preserved.
First-Level Analysis
For the 2 analyses, SPM{t} contrast images were computed for each re-
gressor at the ﬁrst level.
Second-Level Analysis
SPM{t} contrast images from the ﬁrst level were input into a second-
level full factorial random effects ANOVA with pooled variance. An
F-contrast was performed in the factorial analysis to look for voxels in
which activity showed an interaction between synchronicity and con-
gruency (we deﬁned the contrast as [1, −1, −1, 1] with the Sync-Cong
and Async-Incong conditions corresponding to the 2 positive contrast
weights) with a linear combination of the betas across the 3 sessions.
In the parametric analysis, F-contrasts were applied at the second level
to look for areas in which activity varied statistically with a linear com-
bination of the betas corresponding to the parametric modulator
across the sessions.
To correct for multiple comparisons we used 2 approaches. First,
we corrected using Familywise error rate (FWE, P < 0.05) correction
across the whole brain. Second, to avoid false-negative results from the
deployment of this conservative statistical threshold in areas previously
implicated in static self-face recognition and in areas involved in bodily
illusions, we applied small volume corrections of an 8 mm sphere
around the MNI coordinates in the IPS, occipital face area (OFA), and
the ITG from Apps et al. (2012), the premotor and cerebellar coordi-
nates from Ehrsson et al. (2004), and the TPJ coordinate of Ionta et al.
(2011) (see Table 1). To ensure that activity in areas that others have
previously implicated in self-face recognition with static images were
Table 1
Coordinates used for small volume corrections
Anatomical region MNI coordinate
Occipital
Right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19)a 48, −62, −8
Temporal
Right posterior superior temporal gyrus (in tde temporo-parietal
junction region)b
54, −52, 26
Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 21)a 62, −12, −16
Parietal
Right intraparietal sulcus (BA 7)a 28, −62, 48
Frontal
Precentral gyrus (BA 6)c 51, 0, 48
Cerebellum
Lobule VIc 48, −57, −27
Coordinates taken from the areas responding to the current self-face in (a) Apps et al. (2012); to
the mislocation of the body in space (b) in Ionta et al. (2011); and when experiencing the rubber
hand illusion (c) in Ehrsson et al. (2004).
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not engaged during the synchronous, congruent touch, we performed
additional small volume corrections in 3 areas. We performed small
volume corrections in the right insula (38, 22, 16 (Taliarach coordi-
nates)), and the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (48, 32, 14) from Devue
et al. (2007), as well as in the left Fusiform Gyrus (−42, −56, 16) from
Sugiura et al. (2005). These coordinates were reported in the original
papers in Taliarach coordinates and were converted into MNI coordi-
nates (Calder et al. 2001) for the small volume corrections. However, we
would not predict an effect in these areas, as we previously did not ﬁnd
these areas to be involved in current self-face recognition (Apps et al.
2012). We used the coordinates of these other studies to avoid any
effects of circularity that occur when using the results of one analysis to
inform an additional nonorthogonal analysis applied to the same dataset
(Kriegeskorte et al. 2009) (i.e., we did not use coordinates from the fac-
torial analysis as corrections for the parametric analysis or vice versa). In
addition, this enabled us to make important inferences about whether
areas previously implicated in face recognition, or areas involved in mul-
tisensory processing, are engaged duringmirror self-recognition.
Results
Behavioral Results
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the responses to the statement
“I felt like I was looking at my face,” presented after each stimu-
lation block, revealed an interaction effect between Synchro-
nicity and Congruency (F1,14 = 16.84, P < 0.001; see Fig. 1c).
Planned pairwise comparisons between the Sync-Cong condi-
tion and the other 3 control conditions (Async-Cong, t14 = 10.65,
P < 0.001; Async-Incong, t14 = 11.41, P < 0.001; and Sync-Incong,
t14 = 6.72, P < 0.001) showed signiﬁcantly higher responses on
the Likert scale for the Sync-Cong than each of the other con-
ditions. Thus, participants experienced the illusory effect more
strongly in the Sync-Cong condition than in any other condition,
as predicted.
fMRI Results
To analyze the fMRI data, we employed 2 approaches. First, we
performed a factorial analysis to look for voxels in which
activity showed an interaction effect between Synchronicity
and Congruency. Second, we performed a parametric analysis
that looked for voxels in which activity in each block, regard-
less of the condition, was scaled with the responses on the
Likert scale to the enfacement question at the end of each
block of stimulation. The factorial analysis revealed activity in
several areas (see Table 2) that survived whole-brain correction
for multiple comparisons. Small volume corrections around
the coordinates of previous studies (Ehrsson HH et al. 2004;
Ionta et al. 2011; Apps et al. 2012) revealed interaction effects
in the right IPS (MNI coordinates: 28, −58, 52; Z = 5.21,
P < 0.05 svc), the right IOG (putatively in the OFA; 50, −68,
−4; Z = 5.45, P < 0.05 svc) and the posterior portions of the
superior temporal gyrus in the right TPJ (54, −48, 20; Z = 5.45,
P < 0.05 svc) and these regions were also identiﬁed as parts of
clusters within the whole-brain analysis (P < 0.05 FWE).
Similar corrections around the ITG, premotor cortex, and cer-
ebellar coordinates did not reveal any interaction effects
(P > 0.05 uncorrected). We found no voxels that showed a
main effect of congruency or synchronicity even at a reduced
threshold (P < 0.005 uncorrected).
The parametric analysis did not ﬁnd any voxels in which
activity co-varied with the Likert scale responses, when cor-
recting for multiple comparisons across the whole brain.
Nevertheless, when applying small volume corrections around
the coordinates from previous studies, we found a negative
correlation between the illusory experience and the magnitude
of BOLD activity in the right TPJ (50, −52, 26; Z = 3.11,
P < 0.05 svc). Examination of the beta coefﬁcients seen in
Figure 2 shows that this effect may be driven by a decrease in
the negative BOLD response (a higher absolute response)
found in all conditions in the experiment. This is in line with
previous studies that have shown experimentally induced
negative BOLD responses in the TPJ (Corbetta et al. 2008;
Geng and Mangun 2011), particularly in tasks that require sub-
jects to attend to differences between self and other, or during
perspective taking tasks (Lombardo et al. 2011; Schnell et al.
2011). In addition, the right IPS (28, −56, 50; Z = 2.97, P < 0.05
svc) and the right IOG (putatively in the OFA; 42, −62, −10;
Z = 3.07, P < 0.05 svc) activity was found to positively co-vary
with the experience of the illusion on the enfacement question.
Small volume corrections around the ITG, premotor, and cer-
ebellar coordinates did not reveal any voxels that showed a
parametric effect. Thus, we ﬁnd that activity in the same
locations as reported in previous studies of self-face recog-
nition (Apps et al. 2012) and bodily illusions (Ionta et al. 2011)
varies parametrically with the extent to which the illusion was
experienced. In addition, they were in the same locations as
the activations identiﬁed by the factorial analysis.
Activity in the Insula, the right inferior frontal gyrus and left
fusiform gyrus was not found to vary parametrically with the
strength of the illusion and did not show an interaction
between synchronicity and congruency even at a lowered
threshold (P < 0.005).
Our results show that activity in a network of areas is modu-
lated by the synchronicity and specular congruency of visuo-tactile
stimulation. Activity in 3 areas that show such an interaction
effect, the rTPJ, rIOG, and the rIPS, ﬂuctuates parametrically with
the extent to which multisensory stimulation leads to the illusory
experience of another’s face being one’s own.
Discussion
We used fMRI to examine brain activity during the illusory
experience of identiﬁcation with another’s face that occurs
Table 2
Full table of results for the congruency × synchronicity interaction
Anatomical region MNI Coordinate
in mm (x,y,z)
z-Value
Occipital
Left lingual gyrus (BA 19) −14, −64, −2 8.90
Right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19) 30, −96, −8 7.90
Left inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19) −22, −96, 0 7.83
Insula
Right short insula gyrus 36, 24, 14 6.44
Left short insula gyrus −36, 16, 8 5.36
Right long insula gyrus 38, −12, 10 5.35
Temporal
Right posterior superior temporal gyrus (in the TPJ
region; BA 39/7)
58, −44, 18 6.08
Parietal
Left intraparietal sulcus (BA 7) −24, −62, 54 5.91
Right parietal operculum (secondary Somatosensory
cortex)
66, −10, 18 5.80
Right intraparietal sulcus (BA 7) 28, −58, 52 5.21
Frontal
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 46) 48, 8, 30 5.44
All results are whole-brain corrected (P < 0.05 FWE). The atlas of Duvernoy (Duvernoy 1999) was
used for anatomical localization.
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following synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation (Tsakiris
2008; Sforza et al. 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al. 2012a).
Activity in the right TPJ, IOG, and the IPS was modulated by
synchronous, congruent visuo-tactile stimulation between
one’s own and another person’s face, and activity in these
areas varied parametrically with the extent to which partici-
pants were experiencing the illusion. We suggest that the inter-
play between the unimodal IOG and the multimodal TPJ and
IPS drives the dynamic process of self-identiﬁcation.
Our results support the notion that dynamic changes in self-
recognition involve plasticity in unimodal self-face represen-
tations. Lateral portions of the IOG contain patches which
respond selectively to particular categories of stimuli, includ-
ing the face selective OFA. Theories of face recognition, sup-
ported by neuroimaging studies, suggest that the OFA
processes individual facial features but does not process con-
ﬁgural information that leads to the representation of an iden-
tity (Barton 2008; Kanwisher and Barton 2011). This would
suggest that synchronous congruent visuo-tactile stimulation
to self and other leads to changes in the unimodal represen-
tations of the low-level visual features of the seen unfamiliar
face stimulus. Such plasticity in the face perception system may
account for the changes in the perceptual experience of the
face during the enfacement illusion, such as the assimilation of
features of the other’s face in the mental representation of
one’s own face, as has been documented in behavioral tasks
(Tajadura-Jiménez et al. 2012a). This is also similar to the ﬁnd-
ings of imaging studies investigating multisensory stimulation
to the body, which reported plasticity in the extrastriate body
area during synchronous stimulation (Ionta et al. 2011).
Importantly, our ﬁndings suggest that the experience of self-
identiﬁcation involves integration in multisensory brain areas.
The ventral IPS receives projections from portions of the
inferior and superior temporal sulci and the IOG (Seltzer and
Pandya 1978, 1980, 1986, 1994; Petrides and Pandya 2009),
which contain face selective patches (Allison et al. 2000;
Haxby et al. 2000; Barraclough and Perrett 2011; Kanwisher
and Barton 2011). The IPS also receives somatosensory and
vestibular input, suggesting involvement in integrating body-
related multisensory information (Seltzer and Pandya 1980,
1986; Lopez and Blanke 2011). Neurophysiological studies in
monkeys and neuroimaging investigations in humans have
identiﬁed bimodal neurons with topographically aligned so-
matosensory and visual receptive ﬁelds in the IPS (Duhamel
et al. 1998; Avillac et al. 2005; Sereno and Huang 2006; Huang
et al. 2012). In addition, the IPS is activated during illusions
where body ownership is modulated such as during the
rubber-hand illusion and whole-body illusions (Ehrsson et al.
2004, 2005; Petkova et al. 2011), and also when seeing touch
on another’s face in a (Cardini et al. 2011). These ﬁndings
suggest that the IPS integrates visual and somatosensory infor-
mation to create a coherent representation of one’s body and
its peripersonal space, which results in predictions being
formed about the likelihood of upcoming somatosensory
input (Blanke 2012).
It is suggested that synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation
leads to an updating of the near-space representation of one’s
face and hand that is processed in the IPS (Brozzoli et al. 2011,
2012a, 2012b; Cardini et al. 2013). Interestingly, it has also
been shown that a rapid, plastic re-mapping of the visuo-tactile
Figure 2. fMRI results. Activity in voxels that showed a signiﬁcant interaction between Synchronicity and Congruency, and also in which activity varied parametrically with the
illusory experience. Voxels that showed this response were found in the right TPJ (a), the right IOG (b) and the right IPS (c) and are displayed in the upper panels (P< 0.001
uncorrected is used for display purposes). Plots of the beta coefﬁcients from the peak voxels from the factorial analysis are displayed in the lower panels.
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peripersonal space around one’s body occurs when the body is
seen in the mirror (Maravita et al. 2002). The process of identi-
fying with a body seen in the extrapersonal space, that is, in
the space behind the mirror, alters the processing of the visual
stimuli applied to the reﬂected body, which even though are
seen to be in extrapersonal space they are now being re-
mapped as peripersonal stimuli through the mirror reﬂection
(Holmes et al. 2004). Predictions about the body are therefore
rapidly updated during multisensory experience while
exposed to a mirror reﬂection. Our ﬁnding is consistent with
this view. In this study, as the face was not experienced as
“me” during the control conditions, the approaching cotton
bud was not predictive of an impending tactile stimulation to
the same location on the subject’s face. Thus, only during the
illusory condition would an experience be akin to looking in a
mirror and would plastic updating occur to the perispersonal
space. This ﬁnding suggests that the conditions that elicit the
enfacement illusion result in multisensory driven predictions
about upcoming somatosensory input, which are processed in
the IPS. Such an effect may be central to the experience of
ownership of one’s face when looking in a mirror.
The TPJ is known for its role in integrating multisensory
information and in the processing of the ﬁrst-person perspec-
tive. The portion of the TPJ in the upper bank of the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the adjacent portion of the
angular gyrus are connected to multisensory areas including
the ventral IPS, the anterior insula (AI) and the premotor
cortex, but also to visual areas including the lateral occipital
areas, inferior temporal cortex and additionally to the primary
and secondary somatosensory areas (Seltzer and Pandya 1978,
1989, 1994; Barnes and Pandya 1992; Augustine 1996; Cipollo-
ni and Pandya 1999; Petrides and Pandya 2009; Mars et al.
2012). Notably, the cluster we identiﬁed is distinct from the
portion of the TPJ often referred to as being part of the default-
mode network (Mars et al. 2012).
A recent study by Ionta et al. (2011) showed that stimulation
to the trunk, which causes the illusory experience of one’s
body being located above its actual position, modulates activity
in the same portion of the TPJ that was activated in our study.
Lesions and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-induced
disruptions to this region elicit out of body experiences
(Blanke and Mohr 2005; Ehrsson 2007). Neuroimaging studies
also show that the same portion of the TPJ is engaged during
self-face recognition (Uddin et al. 2005; Kaplan et al. 2008;
Apps et al. 2012), and some have suggested the same portion
is activated when processing others’ mental states (Saxe and
Kanwisher 2003; Frith and Frith 2006; Hampton et al. 2008;
Aichhorn et al. 2009). Interestingly, this area is also engaged
when processing the level of trust that one should have with
another and the level of similarity of another’s face based on
how trustworthy it is (Behrens et al. 2008; Hampton et al.
2008). Increasing trust with another also increases the level of
perceived similarity between one’s own and another’s face
(Farmer, Mckay and Tsakiris, in press). This seems to indicate
that the magnitude of the TPJ response is a function of the
extent to which perspectives, self or other, are being pro-
cessed. We found a reduction in the magnitude of the BOLD
response in the TPJ that was scaled with the experience of en-
facement. This result suggests that during synchronous con-
gruent stimulation participants represented and experienced
the seen face as self, while in the control conditions, they rep-
resented 2 individuals, the self and the other seen face. This
effect may be an important neural marker of visual self-
recognition, as seeing one’s face in a mirror reﬂects a rare in-
stance in which a face is seen but is experienced as mine. In
addition, given the important role that this region has in pro-
cessing social information (Behrens et al. 2008; Zaitchik et al.
2010; Carter et al. 2012; Mars et al. 2012; Santiesteban et al. in
press), it is possible that plasticity in the representation of the
self-face in the TPJ may underpin changes in sociocognitive
processing that occur following the experience of enfacement
(Maister et al. 2013).
Neuroimaging studies have identiﬁed regions that are
engaged during self-face recognition, when viewing static
visual stimuli (Platek et al. 2008; Devue and Bredart 2011).
Such studies have reported activity in many regions including:
the right TPJ, right IOG, right inferior/middle frontal gyrus
(IFG/MFG), the bilateral IPS, the right ITG, the posterior cingu-
late gyrus, the precuneus, the AI, the fusiform gyrus, and the
temporal poles. Many have argued that these areas therefore
reﬂect the neural basis of mirror self-recognition (Kircher et al.
2000; Uddin et al. 2005; Platek et al. 2006; Devue et al. 2007;
Kaplan et al. 2008; Sugiura et al. 2008; Platek and Kemp 2009;
Heinisch et al. 2011; Apps et al. 2012; Ma and Han 2012).
Our study, by using multisensory stimulation shows that a
small subset of these regions, the TPJ, the IPS, and the IOG,
are involved in the process of experiencing a visually observed
face as “me” and the multisensory process of mirror self-
identiﬁcation. This result therefore suggests that not all of the
regions previously implicated in self-face recognition, may ac-
tually be engaged when identifying one’s self with an image
during online multisensory input.
While the question of maintenance of a self-face represen-
tation has been addressed in several studies with adults (see
Devue and Brédart (2011) for a review), the neurocognitive
mechanisms that allow us to acquire and update, as opposed to
simply maintain a representation of our own face, remain
poorly understood. To frame this problem, consider how we
ﬁrst come to form a mental representation of how we look like
at the ontogenetic level. Infants cannot have a priori knowl-
edge of their appearance. Thus, the initial acquisition of a
mental self-face representation cannot be explained by this
process of comparing an external stimulus to a mental rep-
resentation because a mental representation of what we look
like does not exist a priori. An infant encountering a mirror for
the ﬁrst time must succeed in matching their sensorimotor
experience with the observed sensorimotor behavior of the
object seen inside the mirror (Apps and Tsakiris in press). This
matching between felt and observed sensorimotor signals over
time will lead to the formation of a mental representation of
visual appearance (i.e., “that is my body reﬂected in the
mirror; therefore, that is what I look like”). This process of self-
identiﬁcation allows successful performance in the classic
rouge task of mirror self-recognition (Gallup 1970). Further-
more, as our physical appearance changes over time, the
mental representation of what we look like should possess suf-
ﬁcient plasticity to ensure both the assimilation of changes and
a sense of continuity over time (Apps et al. 2012). Instead, it is
the infants’ ability to integrate online sensorimotor signals
with visual feedback during mirror exposure that allows them
to realize that the face with the rouge spot that they see in the
mirror is their own. A similar process of asimilitating dynamic
multisensory input seems to underpin the updating of self-face
representations. It is therefore important to distinguish
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between 3 key processes: 1) self-identiﬁcation, which allows
for the construction and acquisition of a mental representation
of appearance; 2) self-recognition, which allows for the main-
tenance of a stored mental representation; and 3) self-
updating, which allows for assimilation of physical changes
that will eventually be reﬂected in the mental representation.
While most studies have focused on the second process for
which mnemonic representations seem to be crucial, recent
studies on the enfacement illusion have successfully demon-
strated how multisensory integration can be used to under-
stand the processes of self-identiﬁcation and self-updating.
We here expand this view by highlighting a set of unimodal
and multimodal brain areas that underpin the process of self-
identiﬁcation in response to current multisensory input. We
argue that the processes self-identiﬁcation, self-recognition
and self-updating may conform to a core component of the
principles of predictive coding within the free-energy principle
(Friston 2005, 2009, 2010; Hesselmann et al. 2010; Apps and
Tsakiris in press). This principle, a unifying theory of cortical
function, states that the brain generates a model of the world
through its sensory systems, which leads to predictions about
upcoming sensory input. Sensory input which is not predicted
causes surprise (or “entropy”) in sensory systems. The brain
tries to reduce the average level of surprise across all sensory
systems. This reduction can occur in 2 ways. First, actions can
be performed with predictable outcomes to remove and avoid
surprise. Second, representations of the causes of sensory
events can be updated, to optimize predictions about future
sensory input. Our results and the effect of enfacement can be
explained within this framework. Before synchronous, congru-
ent stimulation, the other’s face is not processed as “me.”
During stimulation, there is surprise induced by the con-
gruency of the seen and felt events. Participants are instructed
to remain motionless during stimulation and therefore they
cannot avoid surprise by performing actions. Thus, the only
way for the brain to minimize the surprise is by updating rep-
resentations of the self-face, with multimodal areas explaining
away surprise in unimodal sensory areas (Apps and Tsakiris in
press). Interestingly, this account argues that when stimuli
become predictable, the BOLD response in areas involved in
processing contextually relevant information is attenuated. In
our study, when the illusion is experienced and subjects are
processing the face as if it was their own in a mirror, the tactile
stimulation becomes more predictable (i.e., as the cotton bud
approaches the face, a tactile stimulation can be predicted on
the same location of one’s own face). The free-energy principle
would therefore predict an attenuated response in areas that
process both visual and tactile information about one’s own
face, during the illusory experience, as opposed to conditions
where separate visual and tactile information need to be pro-
cessed about one’s own and another’s face (Apps and Tsakiris
in press).
Tentatively, our results support this claim. We showed the
involvement of both the unimodal IOG and the multimodal
TPJ and IPS in processing the multisensory driven changes in
the representation of a face, supporting the free-energy claim
that interactions between unimodal and multimodal areas
explain incoming sensory input. Also, we found evidence of
an attenuation of the BOLD response in the TPJ during the illu-
sion condition. Thus, our data support 2 key tenets of a predic-
tive coding account of self-recognition, which may offer an
improvement on past theoretical perspective (Legrand and
Ruby 2009), which have focused on the role of motor efference
for self-awareness. Here, we show that non-motor multisen-
sory information can also update representations and predic-
tions about the self. Future studies should therefore examine
whether predictive coding and the free-energy principle may
be fruitful explicators of the neural basis of self-recognition.
In conclusion, our study shows that plasticity in both unimo-
dal and multisensory areas during visuo-tactile stimulation
leads to another’s face being perceived as one’s own. We argue
that such processes underpin mirror self-recognition and the
ontogeny of representations of one’s visual appearance. These
ﬁndings may be crucial for understanding the neurobiological
processes that underpin our maintenance of a continuous
sense of self as we age, and also the accommodation of the ex-
tensive changes that may occur as a result of ageing, recon-
structive surgery, or traumatic events.
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